. Stimuli and evaluation. a, The full set of stimuli used in this study. We selected faces of four identities (2 female) each posing fear and happiness expressions from the STOIC database 1 as anchor faces. We then created 5 levels of fear-happy morphs, ranging from 30% fear/70% happy to 70% fear/30% happy in a step of 10%. b-e, Group average of psychometric curves for each facial identity. The psychometric curves show the proportion of trials judged as fearful as a function of morph levels (ranging from 0% fearful (100% happy; on the left) to 100% fearful (0% happy; on the right)). Shaded area denotes ±SEM across subjects/ sessions. f,l, Valence ratings across morph levels. i,o, Intensity ratings across morph levels. We asked an independent 10 Asian subjects from South China Normal University (similar to the fMRI subjects) and an independent 13 Caucasian subjects from the United States and Germany (similar to the neurosurgical subjects and amygdala patients) to rate the faces. This group of subjects was independent from any of the subject pools that contributed other data to the paper and generated only ratings of the stimuli as shown in this figure. Each face was rated 5 times on a 1 to 10 scale. We asked 'how pleasant is this emotion that the face shows' for valence, with 1 for very unpleasant and 10 for very pleasant. We asked 'how intense is this emotion that the face shows' for intensity, with 1 for very mild/calm and 10 for very intense/excited. Valence ratings ! 1 decreased with morph levels whereas intensity ratings increased with morph levels. Error bars denote ±SEM across subjects. g,j,m,p, Valence (g,m) and intensity (j,p) ratings shown separately by subject gender. h,k,n,q, Valence (h,n) and intensity (k,q) ratings shown separately for each identity shown in a. Shaded area denotes ±SEM across subjects. neurosurgical, and k-n, control subjects. a,b, Though without explicit confidence ratings, fMRI subjects also showed inverted U-shaped reaction times with respect to morph levels, consistent with lesion, neurosurgical and behavioral healthy controls. b-n, Subjects judged facial emotions faster when they subsequently indicated higher confidence (c, g, k), and they tended to report confidence faster for higher confidence, especially for lesion and control subjects (d, h, l).
a 1 to 10 scale. We asked 'how pleasant is this emotion that the face shows' for valence, with 1 for very unpleasant and 10 for very pleasant. We asked 'how intense is this emotion that the face shows' for intensity, with 1 for very mild/calm and 10 for very intense/excited. Valence ratings decreased with morph levels whereas intensity ratings increased with morph levels. Error bars denote ±SEM across subjects. g,j,m,p, Valence (g,m) and intensity (j,p) ratings shown separately by subject gender. h,k,n,q, Valence (h,n) and intensity (k,q) ratings shown separately for each identity shown in a. Shaded area denotes ±SEM across subjects. neurosurgical, and k-n, control subjects. a,b, Though without explicit confidence ratings, fMRI subjects also showed inverted U-shaped reaction times with respect to morph levels, consistent with lesion, neurosurgical and behavioral healthy controls. b-n, Subjects judged facial emotions faster when they subsequently indicated higher confidence (c, g, k), and they tended to report confidence faster for higher confidence, especially for lesion and control subjects (d, h, l).
However, subjects did not show difference in reaction times of reporting confidence for different morph levels (e, i, m) or ambiguity levels (f, j, n). The behavioral patterns of all three subject groups were comparable. Error bars denote one SEM across subjects/sessions. Nuclei indicated with n.a. were not mapped due to missing T1 structural images (either pre-or post-operative images).
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Supplementary Notes
Logistic mixed model
We used a logistic mixed model to fit behavioral judgments (fear or happy choice) for all subjects with subject group and fear level as the fixed effects and each subject as the random effect. Statistical significance of the model was computed by likelihood ratio tests of the full model with the fixed effect of subject group or fear level against a null model without the fixed effect of subject group or fear level. We found that in the full model, fear level could predict behavioral judgments with a significant regression coefficient (9.84±0.20 (mean±SEM), 95% CI: 
Confidence judgment
We grouped 7 morph levels into 3 ambiguity levels (anchor, 30%/70% morph, 40%-60% morph).
Both explicit confidence ratings (one-way repeated-measure ANOVA of ambiguity levels; lesion ( Fig. 1h) 
Fusiform face area (FFA) also tracks emotion degree and ambiguity
We first identified a functional ROI within the FFA sensitive to faces using the face localizer task 
Control analysis for emotion-tracking neurons and ambiguity-coding neurons
We carried out several control analyses to confirm the emotion tracking ( Supplementary Fig.   7e ,f). When we randomly assigned morph levels for each trial, we observed chance selection (1000 permutations, mean±SD: 11.67±3.15; two-tailed t-test against the number of chance selection (11.7 neurons): P=0.78). Furthermore, when testing with different time windows after face onset, we could also select similar numbers of neurons. We could also select similar numbers of neurons when using equal number of trials at each morph level. Together, we confirmed that neurons in the amygdala parametrically and linearly track gradual changes of facial emotions along the fear-happy dimension.
Using the same selection (linear regression) as emotion-tracking neurons but with only those trials on which patients classified the face as "fear" or "happy", respectively, we could select 32 We carried out a permutation test to confirm the ambiguity coding ( Supplementary Fig. 7h-j) .
When we randomly assigned ambiguity levels for each trial, we observed chance selection of 11.72±3.34 (mean±SD) neurons (1000 permutations; two-tailed t-test against the number of chance selection (11.7 neurons): P=0.86), among which 6.13±2.51 neurons showed positive correlations (higher response for anchor faces) and 5.58±2.28 neurons showed negative correlations (higher response for more ambiguous faces), in contrast to our observed data with predominantly positive correlations. Together, we confirmed that the ambiguity-coding neurons that we observed were not due to chance.
To further exclude the possibility that different numbers of repetitions for each stimulus level might have resulted in a greater response to anchor faces because the anchor faces were shown less often (i.e., leading to reduced habituation across presentations and thus weaker adaptation 1 ),
we separately analyzed the recordings performed in sessions where all stimuli (anchors and morphs) were shown exactly the same number of times (see Methods). We found very similar proportions of amygdala neurons encoding emotion ambiguity in this group of patients (14 ambiguity-coding neurons among 102 neurons, 13.7%, binomial P<10 −3 ; 11 neurons had the maximal firing rate for anchors and 3 neurons had the maximal firing rate for the most ambiguous faces). This percentage of ambiguity-coding neurons was not significantly different from the entire population (χ 2 -test). This shows that our results did not arise simply from different levels of adaptation due to unequal numbers of repetitions.
Model comparisons
Did emotion-tracking neurons differentiate continuously between levels of fear/happy in a face, or might they respond only once a certain threshold level of "fear" was present in a face? To confirm that our linear model was a better fit of our data and that our data could be better described by a linear relationship rather than a step-like thresholded model, we assessed how good this linear model was compared to two more complex models using the Akaike Information . As a control, we also performed the same comparison for a group of neurons selected using a "step function" model, comparing fearful vs. happy trials with anchor faces only. While many fewer neurons were significant (13/234), we again found that most were fit best by the linear model, even though they were selected using a binary contrast: compared to the logistic function model, linear fitting was better for all neurons (13/13, ΔAIC=13.6±8.36; P=7.41×10 −6 ), and compared to the step function model, linear fitting was better for 11/13 neurons (ΔAIC=3.56±2.74; P=5.34×10 −4 ).
Valence and intensity
Could the decreased neural responses to ambiguity be explained by systematic variability in valence and intensity? To test this, we acquired valence and intensity ratings on our stimuli from 23 additional subjects (Supplementary Fig. 1f-q) . Ten subjects were Eastern Asians ( Supplementary Fig. 1f -k) and 13 were Western Caucasians (Supplementary Fig. 1l-q) . As expected, there was a relationship between decreasing valence and increasing intensity as a function of the fearfulness of the morphed faces ( Supplementary Fig. 1f,i,l,o) . This is consistent with the general evaluation of happy and fear in a two-dimensional structure of affect 2 . In addition, this control experiment also demonstrates that the subtle and gradual changes of facial emotions could be resolved by subjects, a result we also found for both genders ( Supplementary   Fig. 1g,j,m,p) and face identities (Supplementary Fig. 1h,k,n,q) . Crucially, the valence/ intensity ratings did not exhibit the U-shaped pattern that we found for ambiguity-coding signals.
In particular, note that stimuli with the smallest and largest values on both valence and intensity were equally ambiguous. We therefore conclude that the ambiguity signal was not driven by valence or intensity dimensions. Notably, Asians (Supplementary Fig. 1f-k) and Caucasians ( Supplementary Fig. 1l-q) demonstrated similar ratings.
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In addition, when adding the mean intensity rating from Western Caucasians for each face as a covariate into our regression model, we could still select 28 ambiguity-coding neurons (12.0%; binomial P=7.36×10 −6 ; 5 neurons increased firing rate as a function of ambiguity and 23 neurons decreased firing rate as a function of ambiguity), and these neurons had a similar pattern of response to that shown in Fig. 4 . Furthermore, using the same selection as the ambiguity-coding neurons, we found that only 10 neurons had a significant trial-by-trial correlation with intensity ratings (4.27%; binomial P=0.63), and only 1 of these 10 neurons was a ambiguity-coding neuron. Again, similar results were derived when excluding the neuron that also encoded emotion intensity. Together, our results suggest that the response of ambiguity-coding neurons could not be explained by emotion intensity.
Emotion degree and ambiguity coding by each facial identity
Subsets of amygdala neurons have been reported in prior studies to be sensitive to facial identities 3 , an effect which might interact with emotion and ambiguity coding if present also in our data. To explore this possibility, we selected for neurons selective for facial identity (n=24 neurons, 10.3%, binomial P=3.25×10 −4 ). However, none of these neurons were emotion-tracking neurons and only 8/24 neurons were ambiguity-coding neurons. This selection used all trials; when only using anchor trials, we found that there were 10 neurons (4.27%, binomial P=0.63) selective for facial identity and similarly, none of these neurons were emotion-tracking neurons and only 2 neurons were ambiguity-coding neurons. Second, we separately analyzed each facial identity. With Face Model F1 only (Supplementary Fig. 1a) tracking and ambiguity-coding neurons could be selected independently for each identity, and thus encoding of emotion and ambiguity was not driven by facial identity. Note that fewer neurons were selected due to fewer trials and thus reduced statistical power.
Decision coding
First, we found that 20 neurons (8.55%; binomial P=0.0074) differentiated fear and happy decisions using all trials (13 increased and 7 decreased with fear response; unpaired t-test), but only 3 of these neurons were also emotion-tracking neurons and the overlap between these neurons and emotion-tracking neurons was not significant (χ 2 -test: P=0.91), suggesting that it was an independent population of neurons compared with emotion-tracking neurons. Breaking down for morph levels, there were 11 neurons (4.70%) showing higher mean firing for fear judgment at all levels whereas there were 9 neurons (3.85%) showing higher mean firing for happy judgment at all levels. At the most ambiguous morph level (50% fear / 50% happy), 15 neurons (6.41%; binomial P=0.13) could differentiate fear vs. happy response, showing that given identical stimulus, neurons could encode subjective judgment, consistent with our previous finding 4 . Similarly, at the most ambiguous 3 morph levels (40% fear / 60% happy to 60% fear / 40% happy), 15 neurons could differentiate fear vs. happy response. Interestingly, 28 neurons ! 26 (12.0%, binomial P=7.36×10 −6 ) had a higher firing rate for fear response given fearful faces while a higher firing rate for happy response given happy faces, whereas 5 neurons (2.14%)
showed an opposite trend. Such interaction between stimulus and response indicates that these neurons track how much decisions match with stimulus.
Response aligned to button presses and confidence ratings
To provide an initial analysis that might partly separate perceptual and decision processes, we also aligned trials to button presses and quantified the response of each neuron based on the number of spikes in preparation to button press (1s window, starting 1000 ms before button press). We first found that 16 neurons (6.84%; binomial P=0.080) differentiated fear and happy decisions (11 increased and 5 decreased with fear response; unpaired t-test). We could still select 26 emotion-tracking neurons (11.1%, binomial P=5.29×10 −5 ; 14 neurons increased firing rate with fear levels and 12 neurons decreased firing rate with fear levels) and 31 ambiguity-coding neurons (13.3%, binomial P=2.90×10 −7 ; all neurons decreased firing rate with ambiguity levels),
suggesting that the representations of emotion degree and emotion ambiguity were still a robust finding, even using this later time window for analysis.
In another analysis of a different temporal window, we aligned response to confidence ratings and quantified the response of each neuron based on the number of spikes in response to confidence rating (1s window, starting at confidence rating onset). Since we omitted confidence neurons selected by correlation also encoded decisions. These results suggest that emotiontracking and ambiguity-coding representations are no longer evident at this later time window.
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Supplementary Discussion
Neuroimaging studies in humans have identified brain areas that co-vary with some parameters of faces in a continuous manner. In particular, using faces with varying levels of trustworthiness, it has been shown that regions in the amygdala track both how untrustworthy a face appeared (i.e., negative-linear responses) and the overall strength of a face's trustworthiness signal (i.e., nonlinear responses), despite faces not being subjectively perceived 5 . In our present study, we found similar parametric effects, not only with neuroimaging but also in direct electrophysiological responses.
Although most studies find activation within the amygdala that is highest for fearful faces 6-8 , there are also studies showing that the amygdala responds to neutral or happy faces 9 as well as to some extent all facial expressions 10 . Such general coding of facial expressions is also evident at the single-neuron level [11] [12] [13] [14] . Notably, even using the same faces, amygdala BOLD response increases for fearful faces vs. happy faces when using a face mask whereas it decreases for fearful faces vs. happy faces when using a pattern mask 15 . Therefore, the sign of the amygdala's BOLD response to facial emotions may largely depend on the task. In the present study, we found both fear-tracking and happy-tracking neurons. There were overall more fear-tracking neurons than happy-tracking neurons (21 vs. 12; χ 2 -test: n.s.), whereas we found a greater BOLD signal for happy faces in the left amygdala. However, these findings are actually not discrepant, since 11 out of 12 neurons showing increasing firing rate with the degree of happiness were in the left amygdala.
The most ambiguous faces are in the middle of a face continuum whereas anchor faces are at the extremes of the continuum. Thus, another possible explanation of the amygdala responses to emotion ambiguity that we observed could be that the amygdala encodes the absolute distance from the average face, consistent with a previous finding that the amygdala has a stronger response to the extremes of the dimensions than to faces near the average face 16 . Furthermore, adaptation studies seek a graded recovery from neural adaptation with ever greater dissimilarity between pairs of stimuli 1 . In the present study, anchor faces are more distinctive compared to ambiguous faces and are thus less subject to adaptation from perceptual neighbors. Therefore, ! 29 more pronounced adaptation for stimuli in the middle than at the extremes of the face continuum could in principle be one mechanism that explains the amygdala's response to ambiguity we found in our study. However, we used a sufficient number of distinct stimuli, and their order was completely randomized, making face adaptation not likely in our protocol. Moreover, adaptation to facial emotion was likely to be lower when facial identity also changed on a trial-by-trial basis as in the present study.
In this study, we showed that two closely related variables with meta-information about the decision itself (fear/happy) are represented in the amygdala, one based on objective discriminability of the stimuli, and the second based on the subjective judgment of their discriminability: ambiguity and confidence. This is interesting, because a judgment of confidence is thought to be a direct consequence of an assessment of uncertainty 17 . The mechanisms by which such confidence judgments are made, however, remain poorly understood. It has been suggested that confidence judgments rely on a modified "race to threshold" approach, which relies on integrating the evidence for and against a hypothesis separately. The difference between the two quantities of integrated evidence is proportional to the subjective confidence in the decision 17 . In a recognition memory task, we have recently shown that the activity of a specific subset of human amygdala neurons is compatible with this model: the stronger the integrated difference between a familiarity and a novelty signal carried by individual neurons, the larger the subjective confidence 18 . Together, this raises the important question of whether the amygdala provides a general ambiguity signal that provides the underlying information necessary to judge the confidence in decisions about internal states in general. This important hypothesis remains to be investigated by comparing the activity of the same neurons in several different decisionmaking tasks.
Many neurons in the macaque amygdala change their firing rate in response to rewards or stimuli predicting the later delivery of rewards or punishments. For example, amygdala neurons differentiate between cues that predict delivery of positively-or negatively valued rewards 19 and they respond to reinforcements that are unexpected 20 . Reward-related coding of uncertainty has also been identified in macaque midbrain dopamine 21 and septal neurons 22 , which signal after ! 30 cues that predict unreliable rather than reliable rewards 23 . In these studies, individual visual stimuli are associated with the probability of obtaining reward after extensive conditioning. In contrast, in our task no trial-by-trial feedback or reward is delivered, no training on the ambiguity associated with each stimulus is provided and the neurons we identified have a stimulus-evoked response unrelated to reward delivery or expectation. We thus here show a reward-and reward-value independent decreasing response to ambiguity (increasing response to certainty) in the amygdala. Human single-neuron recordings are uniquely suited to test this hypothesis, because no training before the recording is required and patients are able to perform the task without rewards and punishments to incentivize correct performance.
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